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The influence of ego depletion on
sprint start performance in athletes
without track and field experience
Chris Englert 1*, Brittany N. Persaud 2, Raôul R. D. Oudejans 2 and Alex Bertrams 1
1 Department of Educational Psychology, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, 2 Department of Human Movement Sciences,
MOVE Research Institute Amsterdam, VU University, Amsterdam, Netherlands
We tested the assumption that ego depletion would affect the sprint start in a sample
of N = 38 athletes without track and field experience in an experiment by applying a
mixed between- (depletion vs. non-depletion) within- (T1: before manipulation of ego
depletion vs. T2: after manipulation of ego depletion) subjects design. We assumed that
ego depletion would increase the possibility for a false start, as regulating the impulse to
initiate the sprinting movement too soon before the starting signal requires self-control. In
line with our assumption, we found a significant interaction as there was only a significant
increase in the number of false starts from T1 to T2 for the depletion group while this
was not the case for the non-depletion group. We conclude that ego depletion has a
detrimental influence on the sprint start in athletes without track and field experience.
Keywords: ego depletion, reaction time, self-control, self-regulation, sprint
Introduction
For elite level performance in the track and field 100 meter dash it is decisive to initiate the
sprinting motion as quickly as possible following the starting signal (e.g., Santana, 2000; Gough,
2006; Pilianidis et al., 2012), as for instance Harland and Steele (1997) have shown that the sprint
start accounts for roughly 5% of the total race time. At the same time, potential false starts need to
be averted as it could mean getting disqualified from the competition (e.g., Ditroilo and Kilding,
2004). Previous research has demonstrated that the quality of the sprint start is essential for peak
performance (e.g., Brown and Vescovi, 2012). International Association of Athletics Federations
(2013) established a false start criterion to make sure that athletes do not “guess” when to start and
thus initiate their sprinting motions too early. This false start criterion is violated if athletes initiate
their sprinting motion less than 100 ms after the starting signal has been given.
When being in the starting block an athlete wants to gain an edge by delivering a perfect start
(Collet, 1999), while at the same avoiding a false start as it could mean immediate disqualification.
We assume that inhibiting this starting impulse and also initiating the movement are both acts
that require self-control, an assumption we will explain in more detail below. Self-control means
the ability to volitionally override predominant response tendencies in order to achieve a specific
goal (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998). In their strength model of self-control Baumeister et al. (1998)
postulate that self-control acts are based on one global, metaphorical resource, the so-called self-
control strength (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998; Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). Self-control strength
is not domain-specific as all self-control acts (e.g., emotion regulation, persistence) are energized
by the same resource (e.g., Muraven and Baumeister, 2000). For instance a primary cognitive
task requiring self-control can negatively influence performance of tasks in different domains
(e.g., emotion regulation; Englert and Bertrams, 2013). The capacity of this resource is limited,
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however, and can become temporarily depleted after previously
exerting self-control, which is a temporary state labeled ego
depletion (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1994). There is a carry-over
effect on subsequent self-control performance, as individuals do
not perform up to their capabilities in a state of ego depletion (for
an overview, see the meta-analysis by Hagger et al., 2010). In the
domain of sport psychology previous research has demonstrated
that individuals in a state of ego depletion are less persistent in
straining physical exercises (e.g.,MartinGinis andBray, 2010), are
more likely to choke under pressure (e.g., Englert and Bertrams,
2012; Englert et al., 2015), and even display lower performance in
well-elaborated exercises (e.g., pushups; Dorris et al., 2012).
The sprint start also requires self-control strength as there are
two competing impulses that need to be volitionally regulated:
On the one hand, the impulse to start too soon needs to be
regulated. As previously mentioned, while being in the starting
block an athlete wants to gain an edge by initiating the movement
immediately after the starting signal. Therefore the predominant
response tendency would be to initiate the movement at the
risk of displaying a false start and self-control strength would be
necessary to volitionally downregulate this behavioral tendency
in order to avoid false starts. This is in line with studies in
which participants in a state of ego depletion were less adept in
controlling their motor impulses (e.g., Finkel et al., 2006; McEwan
et al., 2013; Graham et al., 2014). On the other hand, reacting as
quickly as possible after having received a signal is an act that is
also based on self-control, especially if participants are well aware
of the negative consequences of starting too early. In that case, the
predominant response tendency would be to rather wait to initiate
a movement in order to minimize the possibility of a false start.
Self-control would then be necessary to volitionally override this
behavioral tendency as quickly as possible. Indeed, several studies
have demonstrated that reaction times can be impaired under
ego depletion, as for instance ego depleted individuals display
longer response latencies in the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), which
is also a task in which a predominant tendency (i.e., to name
the color word) needs to be substituted by a different response
(i.e., to name the font color instead; e.g., Richeson and Shelton,
2003).
In a recent study, Englert and Bertrams (2014) found that the
reaction times in sprints depend on self-control strength. In their
study athletes with experience in the track and field 100 meter
dash, displayed slower reaction times in a state of ego depletion
as compared to a state with temporarily available self-control
strength. Interestingly, there was no effect of ego depletion on
the number of false starts. The authors reasoned that experienced
sprinters are well aware of the drastic negative consequences of
false starts (i.e., disqualification), which led to a dominance of the
tendency to rather “wait” a little longer in the starting block, than
to risk the possibility of a disqualification by initiating the motion
too early. Therefore, in experienced athletes self-control strength
would be necessary to override this predominantwaiting tendency
which is why athletes in a state of ego depletion took longer
to initiate their movements. According to Englert and Bertrams
(2014) the level of expertise seemed to be an important factor in
their study. Indeed, false starts are less likely in more experienced
sprinters (Majumdar and Robergs, 2011; Pilianidis et al., 2012).
In the current study, we again tested the effect of ego-
depletion on sprint performance but now of athletes without
specific track and field sprinting experience, but with general
sprinting experience, namely experienced female soccer players.
We wondered whether an effect of ego depletion on false
starts would emerge in this specific sample. It could be argued
that in athletes without sprinting experience the response to
suppress and avoid false starts may be less developed than in
experienced track and field sprinters. Athletes without track and
field experience may be less aware of the negative consequences
of a false start. This would imply that for athletes without track
and field experience the dominant response would always be
to start as quickly as possible without the competing response
to not initiate too early. This would mean that in a state of
ego depletion they would have less self-control to suppress the
strongmovement response immediately before the starting signal,
which in turn would increase the likelihood of false starts.
The theoretical implication of such a finding would be that
level of experience moderates how the detrimental effect of ego
depletion on the sprint start occurs—as slowing down the starting
speed in experienced athletes (Englert and Bertrams, 2014) or
as instigating false starts in inexperienced athletes (the present
study).
In a mixed between- (depletion vs. non-depletion) within- (T1
vs. T2) subjects design female soccer players performed a series of
three 20-m sprints at baseline (T1) and following an ego depletion
manipulation (T2). We measured the average reaction times (in
ms) and the number of false starts at both times of measurement.
As mentioned, we expected the number of false starts to increase
in a state of ego-depletion.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Our sample consisted of 38 Collegiate level female soccer players
who voluntarily participated in the experiment (Mage = 20.58,
SDAge = 2.10; years of soccer experience:M = 14.13, SD = 3.88).
The results of a G*Power analysis demonstrated that our sample
size was sufficient to detect at least a medium effect in the current
study (Faul et al., 2007; parameters: f = 0.25, a= 0.05, 1-b= 0.80,
rrepeated measures = 0.50, " = 1). A previous health screening did
not reveal any physical impairments in any of the participants
and no participant had performed any straining physical activity
beforehand. Participants were randomly assigned to a depletion
group (n = 19 depletion) or a non-depletion group (n = 19).
We obtained written informed consent from each participant
before the experiment and the study was approved by the local
ethics committee and carried out in accordance with the Helsinki
declaration of 1974.
Materials and Procedure
The study was conducted by the same experimenter on the
training facilities of the respective soccer club. Participants first
reported demographic information (i.e., age, sex, years of soccer
experience) and completed an individual warm up phase of
approximately 5–10 min.
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Then, participants were familiarized with the sprint protocol.
Subjects were directed to stand on a touch-and-release pad from
which the reaction times were recorded (e.g., Haugen et al., 2012).
The auditory stimuli was delivered via a Brower Timing System
(Brower, Salt Lake City, UT, USA) synched with a start timer.
The Brower Timing System has proven to be a reliable measure
of reaction times (e.g., Hetzler et al., 2008). The sprint protocol
began when the Brower Timing System provided an acoustic
starting signal. In line with the guidelines of the International
Association of Athletics Federations (2013) the timeframe “set”
and the start signal was 1–3 s and was randomly chosen for
each sprint to minimize the likelihood of guessing when to start.
The reaction times were measured from the acoustic starting
signal to the time when the pressure from the front foot against
the touch-and-release pad was removed. The participants first
completed three 20-m practice trials at 50% maximum speed
with the addition of an auditory stimulus, to allow the individual
to become familiar with the system. This trial protocol was
completed at a submaximal level so that fatigue would not
influence the participant’s subsequent sprint performance during
the experimental trials. After a short recovery, as baselinemeasure
(T1) participants then performed three maximum speed 20 m
sprints and were instructed, upon hearing the acoustic signal,
to sprint as quickly as possible, from the touch-and-release pad.
Following each trial, participant’s passively recovered for 90 s
(Frost et al., 2008). Reaction times and false starts were derived
for each experimental trial, with reaction times below 100 ms also
counted as false starts.
During the adjacent recovery phase the participants completed
several self-report measures. We measured participants’ level of
trait self-control strength by administering the brief Self-Control
Scale (Tangney et al., 2004). The scale consisted of 13 items
(e.g., “I am good at resisting temptations”; a = 0.63) which had
to be answered on 5-point Likert-type scales, ranging from 1
(not at all) to 5 (very much). We did not expect any statistically
significant differences between our experimental groups in their
dispositional self-control strength.
We also measured depletion sensitivity by applying the
Depletion Sensitivity Scale (Salmon et al., 2014) which contains
15 items (e.g., “I get mentally fatigued easily”; a = 0.82) getting
answered on 7-point Likert-type scales (1   totally disagree to
7  totally agree). This scale was implemented because we wanted
to analyze if the experimental groups differed in their proneness
to ego deletion in the current study.
Then, self-control strength was experimentally manipulated.
The self-control manipulation compromised of transcribing a
neutral text for 6 min on a separate sheet of paper (Bertrams
et al., 2010). In the depletion group participants were instructed
to always omit the letters “e” and “n” while transcribing the
text. This task requires self-control strength as individuals need
to volitionally override their habitual writing tendencies when
completing the task (e.g., Muraven, 2008). Participants from the
non-depletion group transcribed the same text conventionally as
no additional instructions were given, which does not require use
of self-control strength. Therefore, in the non-depletion group,
self-control strength should remain relatively intact as opposed to
the depletion group (cf. Schmeichel, 2007; Bertrams et al., 2010).
To determine the validity of the self-control manipulation
participants were required to answer a four-item manipulation
check (e.g., Englert and Bertrams, 2014) related to the
transcription task (“How difficult did you find the task?”
“How effortful did you find the task?” “How mentally depleted
do you feel at the moment?” “How strongly did you have
to regulate your writing skills?”; a = 0.80) on Likert-type
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). The
transcribed texts were also analyzed for the following variables:
number of characters transcribed and percentage of errors
made.
Directly following the manipulation check participants were
asked to complete another series of three 20 m sprints at
maximal effort (T2). The procedure was identical to the baseline
measurement (T1). Again, we measured reaction time and
number of false starts via the Brower timing system.
Once the experiment was completed, participants were
debriefed, asked if they had any questions, and thanked for their
participation.
Results
Preliminary Analyses
The results of the following analyses are displayed in Table 1.
Analyses of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the depletion and
non-depletion group did neither differ in their trait self-control
strength,F(1, 36)= 0.82, p= 0.37,!2p= 0.02, nor in their depletion
sensitivity, F(1, 36) = 2.58, p= 0.12, !2p = 0.07.
In line with our assumptions, participants from the depletion
group had higher scores on themanipulation check indicating that
they had to invest more self-control strength while transcribing
the text, F(1, 36) = 25.95, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.42. In the depletion
group participants also transcribed statistically significantly fewer
words, F(1, 36) = 19.51, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.35, and committed
more mistakes, F(1, 36) = 35.92, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.50. These
results indicate that our experimentalmanipulation of self-control
strength was successful.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics: means and standard deviations.
Group
Depletion Non-depletion
Variable M SD M SD
SCS 3.31 0.41 3.44 0.51
DSS 3.66 0.85 3.17 0.99
Manipulation check 4.86 0.97 2.97 1.28
Transcribed characters 114.21 20.69 146.47 24.20
Number of mistakes 9.58 5.10 1.79 2.46
Number of false starts T1 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.23
Number of false starts T2 1.05 0.97 0.21 0.42
n = 19 in ego depletion group, n = 19 in non-depletion group. Overall scores of a
psychometric scale were obtained by averaging the responses to the scale items. SCS
= Brief Self-Control Scale; DSS = Depletion Sensitivity Scale. Number of false starts T1
= Average number of false starts out of three 20-m maximal effort sprints at first time of
measurement; Number of false starts T2 = Average number of false starts out of three
20-m maximal effort sprints at second time of measurement.
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Main Analyses
First, we conducted a 2 (group: depletion vs. non-depletion)  2
(time of measurement: T1 vs. T2) mixed-design ANOVA to
analyze whether ego depletion affected the number of false starts.
For this reason, we averaged each participant’s number of false
starts, separately for T1 and T2. A significant main effect of group
emerged, F(1, 36)= 10.33, p= 0.001, !2p = 0.22. There was also a
main effect of time of measurement, F(1, 36) = 23.34, p < 0.001,
!2p = 0.39. Most important, we found a significant interaction
between group and time of measurement, F(1, 36) = 12.75,
p < 0.001, !2p = 0.26. Post hoc pair-wise comparisons with
Bonferroni corrections showed that in the depletion group the
average number of false starts significantly increased fromT1 (i.e.,
before the ego depletion manipulation) to T2 (i.e., after the ego
depletionmanipulation), F(1, 36)= 35.29, p< 0.001, !2p= 0.50. In
contrast, therewas no significant difference in the average number
of false starts between T1 and T2 in the non-depletion group, F(1,
36)= 0.79, p= 0.38, !2p = 0.02.
Comparison of the total number of false starts per group
and time of measurement confirmed the results of the ANOVA.
For the depletion group the number of false starts increased
significantly from 0 to 20 from T1 to T2, 2(1, N = 21) = 17.19,
p< 0.001 while this was not the case for the non-depletion group,
with 1 false start at T1 and 4 at T2, 2(1, N = 5) = 1.8, p = 0.18.
(Note that in the first chi-square analysis we substituted 1 for 0 as
zeros are not accepted in the analysis).
We could not reasonably analyze average reaction times as
another dependent variable. This was due to the relatively high
number of false starts (i.e., our variable of primary interest) that
was unequally distributed over the experimental conditions. False
starts represent missing values in terms of start reaction times
in our data set. (Note that our timing device did not count the
reaction times of false starts but only indicated that a start was
invalid).
Discussion
In sprints in track and field split seconds can determine the
finish in a 100 m dash (e.g., Harland and Steele, 1997; Santana,
2000; Gough, 2006; Pilianidis et al., 2012). This highlights the
importance of initiating the sprinting movement as quickly as
possible after the starting signal has been given. However, starting
too early leads to immediate disqualification from competition
(e.g., Ditroilo and Kilding, 2004). Therefore, an athlete on the
one hands needs to inhibit the impulse of starting too early and
on the other hand needs to volitionally override the tendency to
wait too long. Both acts, inhibiting a movement and initiating a
movement, are considered self-control acts (e.g., Richeson and
Shelton, 2003; Finkel et al., 2006; McEwan et al., 2013; Graham
et al., 2014). According to the strength model, self-control acts
are performed less efficiently after having previously exerted
self-control in a preceding task (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998).
Englert and Bertrams (2014) found that participants in a state of
ego depletion showed slower average reaction times in a series
of sprints as compared to a control group with available self-
control strength. However, the authors did not find any effect
of ego depletion on the number of false starts. The sample in
that study consisted of track and field athletes with experience in
the 100 m dash and the athletes were well aware of the negative
consequences of a false start (i.e., immediate disqualification).
That is why the authors reasoned that in experienced track and
field athletes the predominant response tendency while waiting in
the starting block is to make sure not to initiate their movement
too soon. The ability to volitionally override this response
tendency depends on self-control strength, which is why athletes
in a state of ego depletion displayed slower average reaction times.
In that study no false starts occurred; consequently, there was
no significant effect of ego depletion on the number of false
starts.
In the present study, we wanted to expand the findings by
Englert and Bertrams (2014) as we conducted a similar study with
a sample of athletes without any experience in track and field
(i.e., female soccer players). We postulated that in inexperienced
athletes the predominant response tendency in a starting block
may not be to avoid a false start at any cost as the potential
disqualification after a false start is not as well-elaborated in
inexperienced athletes as opposed to well-experienced track and
field athletes. Therefore, we assumed that depleted participants
without sprinting experience would display a higher number of
false starts compared to participants with available self-control
strength. The results were in line with our hypotheses. Compared
to baseline, more false starts occurred on average under ego
depletion, but this was not the case when self-control strength was
intact.
Together with the results of Englert and Bertrams (2014), the
present findings indicate that the level of experience with track
and field sprinting is relevant in terms of how ego depletion
impairs the sprint start. When experience is high, ego depletion
slows the start speed down; when experience is low, ego depletion
increases the likelihood of false starts. A plausible explanation
would be that high and low experienced athletes differ in how
they have built a habit to avoid false starts (and the related
disqualification). However, ego depletion generally seems to be
detrimental to the sprint start. Therefore, regardless of experience
with track and field sprint, athletes are well advised to avoid ego
depletion prior to the sprint start.
We would like to discuss three limitations. First and most
importantly, as previously mentioned it would not have been
appropriate to analyze the average reaction times because of the
fact that the high number of false starts was unequally distributed
over the experimental conditions. This is why we were not
able to directly contrast our findings to the findings of Englert
and Bertrams (2014) in which the authors found out that ego
depletion did influence reaction times in experienced track and
field athletes.
Second, we did not assess participants’ mood following the
transcription task designed to manipulate self-control strength.
One could argue that overriding a well-elaborated behavior (i.e.,
omitting letters while transcribing a text) could be associated with
negative emotional states in contrast to participants who did not
have to exert any self-control strength.However, previous research
has repeatedly demonstrated that the different instructions for the
transcription task did not affect mood (e.g., Englert and Bertrams,
2012).
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Third, recently there have been discussions regarding the
validity of the strength model of self-control, as it has been
argued that impaired self-control performance after a previous
self-control act may not be caused by a temporary depletion of
self-control strength. For instance, Job et al. (2010) found out
that an individuals’ subjective theory about willpower has an
influence on the ego depletion effect: In their study, the typical
ego depletion effect was only found in participants who believed
in a limited capacity of self-control strength (Job et al., 2010).
In contrast, individuals who viewed self-control strength as an
unlimited resource did not suffer from ego depletion. Other
researchers proposed that the negative effects of a primary self-
control act on subsequent self-control performance might be
caused by motivational shifts (e.g., Inzlicht and Schmeichel, 2012;
Inzlicht et al., 2014) or resource allocation (Beedie and Lane,
2012). Although most alternative theoretical models do not deny
that self-control performance gets worse after having performed
a primary self-control task, they highlight the importance of
identifying the actual processes of how ego depletion impairs
performance.
To conclude, our results expand previous findings by Englert
and Bertrams (2014) as we demonstrated that ego depletion also
has a detrimental influence on the sprint start in athletes without
track and field experience. Working on a primary self-control
task (in this case, a cognitive task) had a carry-over effect on a
secondary self-control task from a completely different domain,
in this case a gross motor task.
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